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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is a partial reconstruction of the role of 
agricultural lobbyist and national alliances, determining the effort of re-opening 
the Common Market Organisation (CMO) of wine Reg. 479/2008. The case 
considered is the liberalisation of replanting rights chosen as a tool of public 
choice (PC) analysis. The paper is divided into three parts. The first is a brief 
summary of PC literature and methodological applications. The second is a 
study of the structure, behaviour and the relationship of the main actors 
involved in the policy genesis of the CMO. Third analyses the effects that 
lobbyist actions have generated in the case of vineyard liberalisation. The 
methodological approach is the PC model derived from Pokrivcak et al. (2006). 
This is partially used in this discussion, to explain the general idea and concept 
of bargaining and trade-offs in wine policy by the major actors in a simplified 
scenario. 
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1 Introduction 
In public policy making process, political and economic forces are at play in resolving 
the strategic interactions among the various interests. Public choice (PC) is one of the 
most important approaches used to draw attention to the processes of interaction between 
politicians and the agricultural associations. The aim of the paper is to analyse the role of 
agricultural lobbyist and the national alliances, to determine the possible reasons behind 
the failure of the objective to re-open one of the strongest items of the wine reform: the 
liberalisation of replanting rights. The background of ‘casus belli’ is necessary to 
understand the genesis of the problem. During the discussions about the CMO wine 
reform, the EU Commission (EUC) has argued, ones a long period, to obtain the 
liberalisation of vineyards surface through the abolition of replanting rights. The reasons 
which led to defend this thesis were two fold. Firstly, the EUC proposed a financial 
measure of vineyards grubbing up in marginal areas to reduce surplus production. 
Secondly, through the vineyard liberalisation from December 31st, 2015 [2018 if the 
member states (MS) decides to extend it], the EU could be aligned to the extra EU MS 
without rules and a limitation in ‘quota’ production. The debate was very animated, but 
the EUC was the real winner of the CMO wine bargaining: despite the reduction of the 
vineyards grubbing up surface, it leaves the decision to plant new vineyards to the 
producers, and closed a period of blocking for the new wine land, which lasted over  
20 years. After one year of CMO application, some agricultural pressure groups lobbied 
to EU wine MS producing such as France, Spain and Italy and the European Parliament 
(EUP), to re-opening the wine regulation and in particular, Article No. 92 of vineyard 
replanting rights1. 
As will be explained in the present paper, in the absence of a consensus, qualified 
majority voting is the Council’s key process of decision-making for re-opening and 
modifying a dossier2. Despite the lobbying activity, the necessary votes for re opening the 
dossier, have not yet been obtained, probably due to the closure and strenuous defence of 
the EUC. Why did the vote fail? Have the agricultural lobbies lost a battle or the war? 
2 A brief review of public choice literature 
PC can be defined as the economic study of non-market decision-making, or, simply the 
application of economics to political science. The school of PC, identifies as pressure 
groups or lobbies, stakeholders involved in the political process with the aim to explain 
the role played by decision makers to guide the action. Sometimes it is called the 
‘economic theory of politics’ or ‘(new) political economy’, through the studies of 
political processes and the interaction between the economy and the policy by using the 
tools of neoclassical analysis. The core in these studies can be summarised in three 
definitions: 
1 methodological individualism 
2 rational choice 
3 political trade-offs favours and benefits. 
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As Buchanan and Tullock (1962) artfully defined it, PC is ‘politics without romance’, “in 
the conventional ‘public interest’ view, public officials are portrayed as Public choice 
theory as a tool for CMO wine reform analysis 3 benevolent ‘public servants’ who 
faithfully carry out the ‘will of the people’. In tending to the public’s business, voters, 
politicians, and policy makers are supposed somehow to rise above their own private 
interests concerns.” 
The theory has two principal variants: the ‘Chicago School’, which considers the 
allocation of policy goods through a political market as relatively benign; which concern 
about how competition over government largess undermines social welfare through 
deadweight costs and inefficiencies. Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), and Becker (1983) 
focuses on the impact of regulation and government on the allocation of resources. The 
vote-maximising regulator is constrained to make trade-offs among a variety of interests 
so that politically determined prices are always the result of trade-offs or compromises at 
the margin. The other branch of the interest group theory has been defined by ‘Virginia 
Political Economy School’. Scholars in this tradition have focused on the impact of 
institutions on the wealth transfer process. Landes and Posner (1975) introduced the 
independent judiciary as an enforcer of long-term contracts between the legislators and 
interest groups. Tollison (1988, 1991) showed the impact of legislative institutions on the 
costs and benefits of lobbying. The size of the pressure group is the base of Olson’s 
(1965) theory: “the smaller groups are more likely to provide themselves with a 
collective good simply because of the attraction of the collective good to the individual 
member”. In 1999, Rausser argued that the political power of the organised interest group 
derivers from its capacity to affect the well being of policy makers. The analysis induces 
a political governance structure whose maximisation, with respect to the policy 
instrument, given the prevailing economic structure, leads to a political-economic 
equilibrium (Rausser et al. 2010). 
Although the PC method borrows from economics, its main purposes have been 
focused on the analysis of a variety of political contexts, trade protection (Goulder and 
Eichengreen, 1989), public good provision (Olson, 1965; Downs 1957), and economic 
sanctions (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992). In the agricultural policy’s field, PC 
approaches, have been further developed to cover a wide range of quantitative political 
economic models based on partial economic equilibrium (Henning, 2007; Magee et al., 
1989; Tyres and Andreson, 1992). This includes extensions of the economists Buchanan 
and Tullock (1962). The authors note that farm support is often given through inefficient 
market manipulation, as opposed to more efficient cash subsidies, in order to conceal the 
real scope of the super-normal returns to farming interests through the political process. 
Gardner (1987) explain the intervention in USA commodity markets in aid to farmers 
variables associated with the cost to producers of generating political pressure and the 
social cost of redistribution. The Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995) model is applied 
in the field of the political economy of food trade policies and electoral competition. 
They study how special interest groups influence political outcome to benefit their 
members. Henning (2008) provides a simple legislative bargaining model that analyses 
the role enlargement plays in common agriculture policies (CAP) reforms (Anderson, 
1995). In particular the author demonstrates that owing to the specific nature of the logic 
of policy formulation in the CAP system, enlargement in fact has diverse effects. The 
wide spread literature in agricultural economics tackles the specific roles of agenda 
setting power and financial solidarity in CAP legislative decision making. Coleman and 
Tangermann (1999) view the EUC as an independent body which plays a role as an 
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entrepreneurial leader, and which pursues its own preferences. On the other hand, 
Moravcsik (1994) argues that the commission just decreases transaction costs of  
inter-country bargaining. Modelling this multi-stage and multi-agent decision-making 
process is complicated and, therefore, relatively little formal analysis is devoted to the 
CAP in the political economy literature (Crombez and Swinnen, 2002). A good overview 
of this study is provided by de Gorter et al. (2002). Among the many studies cited above, 
Pokrivcak et al. (2006, 2008), Crombez (2008) and Swinnen (2008, 2010, 2010b) provide 
an interesting formal analysis of CAP decision making, which also highlights the agenda 
setting power of EUC and the role this plays. The model is used to evaluate under which 
conditions CAP reform occurs and how they influence the EUC in the CAP reform. 
3 Political framework: CMO wine reform genesis 
The Common Market Organisation (CMO) of wine is the legal and regulatory basis of 
European wine market covering vineyards to wine production. For the breadth of its 
scope, CMO wine is one of the most articulate laws of the CAP and this is due to the 
complexity and heterogeneity of actors involved more than real market and economical 
needs. The CMO has gradually been established under the CAP since 1962. The most 
important regulations being adopted in 1987 (Reg. 822/1987) and then in 1999  
(Reg. 1493/99) (Crombez et al., 2006; Olper, 1998). After less than ten years, the EUC 
had the opinion that a fundamental reform of the wine CMO was necessary and the new 
reform entered into force on 1st August 2009 (Reg. 479/2008). But why the Reform of the 
Reform? This question is not paradoxical: the wine sector in the global contest of the 
CAP, has been partially treated in a different way. Regardless of the market 
considerations, there are many political reasons that allow to positively answer the above 
question and understand why and how it was modified and accelerated the reform 
process, compared to the guidelines of the programme that had characterised the 
beginning of the debate. CMO is a market regulation with market and policies objectives. 
The aim of new reform was income stabilisation by influencing market equilibrium 
through market intervention measures, on the one hand, and regulation and support for 
the development of a competitive European wine sector on the other. For many decades 
now, the European wine market has suffered recurring overproduction problems, 
although the scale of the imbalance has risen and fallen over time. However, the action to 
rebalance of the market was a dominant concern at the dawn of the revision of Reg. 
1493/99. In particular, the EUC has repeatedly expressed the need for drastic action on 
the surplus of the system called ‘structural’. The problem of overproduction has been 
addressed by means of a policy of limiting production potential, with a ‘quota’ on new 
plantations and an incentive for the permanent abandonment of production through a 
grubbing-up premium. The EUC suggested an intervention based on grubbing up of 
marginal surfaces were growers who wish to leave the sector will be offered a voluntary 
grubbing-up premium. At the same time, EU wine consumption has decreased 
significantly and steadily in recent decades. Wine consumption in Europe has shown a 
significant and continuous decline in the last decades, falling by an average of 750,000 hl 
per year, or 15 million hl in the last 20 years, although in the most recent years the 
decline in consumption has been less pronounced3. Together with over production and 
wine decrease, one of the greatest fears for the EUC, was the ‘attack’ of new wine players 
on EU market. Since 1996, the volume of wine imports into the EU-25 has been growing 
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at a rate of 10% a year, reaching almost 11.8 million hl in 2005. So-called ‘new world’ 
wines have gained considerable market share from EU wines4. The great and true 
expectation, from the wine political and farmer’s actors, was based on the budget that the 
new OCM would have generated: this was to be the main turning point, also for giving 
the right signal to the role that the wine sector has acquired in recent years. In front of 
this objective it can be said that the new CMO has partially failed5 (Gaeta and Corsinovi, 
2009; Gaeta, 2009). Nevertheless the CMO wine Reform was approved and has been 
included in the CAP unique6. 
4 The main actors involved in wine reform process 
The key to understanding the lobbying activities of business interests in wine EU 
lobbying is to conceive the relationship between these private and public actors as an 
exchange relationship between two groups of interdependent organisations (Bouwen, 
2004). According to these theories, Figure 1 show the multiple and complex interests 
involved influencing the outcome of the political process and role of EUC. The single 
interests are represented by policy makers, MS and pressure groups. The EUC is a central 
venue for lobbying activities of interest groups because of its central role in the EU 
legislative process (Greenwood, 2003). As agenda-setter, the commission has the formal 
right to initiate legislation and is thus responsible for the drafting of legislative proposals 
(Bouwen and McCown, 2007). The European Parliament (EP) is increasingly attractive 
to interest groups as a result of its increased legislative power. The EP has the 
competence to amend the commission’s proposals. All legislative proposals and other 
documents must be considered in the committees, so EP is the right venue for lobbyists 
seeking to influence the legislation (Greenwood, 2003). The council of minister, is the 
most intergovernmental institution in EU legislative procedure. The influence of national 
interests prevails in the council, and it is therefore crucial for the MS to identify their 
national interests. 
Figure 1 Decision making model in CMO wine: interest, bargaining and agreement 
 
Source: Our reconstruction on Bouwen’ (2004) model 
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The, so called, ‘third role’ of the EUC represents a central theme in the PC game theory. 
This should have a different function in respect to that of the other policy actors. How to 
divide the European interests, maximising the collective welfare and optimising interests 
and objectives, of the MS? In the context of the EU decision making process, private and 
public actors become interdependent because they need resource and private favours (in 
the welfare of collective) from each other. The results are ‘trade-off’ between pressure 
groups and decision makers. 
Among the European pressure groups considered the main position and lobbying 
action of two wine and agriculture farm organisations: EFOW and COPA-COGECA. The 
EFOW is the voice of European wine origin. It is a Brussels-based organisation 
representing wines with an Appellation of Origin or Geographical Indication from the 
EU. In 2003, the French Organisation (CNAOC) and the Italian Association of 
Geographical Indication wine (FEDERDOC) decided to work jointly on promoting their 
views towards EU decision-maker. Today EFOW also represents, the Conferencia 
Española Vitivinícolas (CECRV), Port and Douro Wines Institute (IVDP) and The 
National Council of Wine (HNT) Hungary. 
COPA is a Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations and represents the 
most ‘viticoltural soul’, expressed at Community level. COPA has been recognised by the 
EU authorities such as the organisation that is expressed on behalf of the European 
agricultural sector as a whole. COGECA is the General Confederation of Agricultural 
Cooperatives in the EU. It represents the interests of some agricultural cooperatives. 
Following the recent enlargements of the EU, COPA and COGECA are committed 
together to strengthen their position as major agricultural organisations of the European 
representation. 
Among the Italian pressure groups, are considered the main position two of the most 
important agriculture unions: Confagricoltura and Coldiretti. The first has traditionally 
outlined the interests of capitalist enterprises and those of medium to large size, while 
Coldiretti is the first agricultural union for number of associates and represented the 
interests of small vineyards property. 
5 The case of liberalisation of replanting rights 
Planting rights are an instrument of market regulation in France since 1953, adopted 
across all Europe from 1970 with the first OCM. From 1987 the system of planting 
regulations has been kept unchanged until 2008, when the CMO reform decided to 
abolish these rights. 
The planting rights are an important benchmark (like litres of milk in milk quotas, 
like acres of vineyards in the case of wine) for each wine company as well as a sort of 
‘productive licence’ if the planting rights are directly linked to a denomination of origin 
(DO). This system in the mind of the legislator enables growers to follow the market 
evolution and, at the same time, it avoids the production excesses in euphoria times, as a 
supply regulator. Replanting rights granted shall correspond to the equivalent of the 
grubbed-up area in terms of pure crop. The sale of the right represents a real sale of 
intangible assets of the farm. Like all goods the planting right or ‘production quota’, is 
part of the landed property and it assumes a value that constitutes part of the corporate 
assets. 
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The EUC has justified the decision to abolish these planting rights mainly with 
economic arguments; for a lack of competitiveness of the European wines caused by 
complex and too restrictive measures. The liberalisation should serve to remove these 
obstacles, enhance competitiveness, while safeguarding the reputation and image of wine 
products in the world. The MS which produce wine were divided on the issue and 
defended different priorities. Only EFOW, COPA-COGECA and a few production MS 
(France, Italy, Germany) were opposed to it. 
COPA-COGECA were concerned about the impact on the EU wine sector if planting 
rights were abolished liberalisation of planting rights would cause major changes to 
Europe’s wine-growing areas. It would imply moving from a system where the producer 
or their cooperative makes the wine to a more intensive industrialised model. It would 
also create huge market imbalances, and result in excess production. Through planting 
rights, European farmers have been able to add value to their produce and to keep it 
within the farming sector7. 
Table 1 Vineyards liberalisation: wine actors’ position 
EU commission proposal Pressure group Political agreement – December, 2007 
334 votes favourable 
331 votes against 
16 abstentions 
Liberalisation of replanting 
right – from 2013 
The EFOW, COPA 
CGECA are opposed 
334 favourable 
Abolition of replanting right Even for DO and IGT wine Italy, France, Spanish, 
Germany – are opposed The end of 2015 in Europe 
 Which future for DO? The end of 2018 in Italy 
Source: Our elaboration from EU Commission and pressure groups report 
Most of the EP members stated that they were in favour of maintaining planting rights. 
The main concerns of mainly pressure group are summarised in Table 1. It shows a 
synthesis of the positions and the results that were obtained, in particular: 
• the extension of the wine-growing areas, for the most successful ones, with 
vineyards outside of the traditional area and with consequently poor performance 
• contamination of traditional production areas limited by DO, with wines from the 
border areas 
• the consequent loss of quality and/or reputation of established products due to 
increased production of uncontrolled borders, perhaps obtained even with the same 
varieties of the DO 
• the extension of the wine-growing areas may in fact create vine-growing in the 
plains, with poor viticulture character, for the production of varietal wines or 
indication geographical typical (IGT), taking advantage of the high yields of these 
vineyards. 
The proposal to eliminate planting rights was approved in 2008 during the reform of the 
wine growing provisions. The EUC published in October 2011 its legislative proposal on  
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the reform of the CAP post-2014. The text includes the disappearance of the planting 
rights regime for viticulture as from January 1st 2016. The commission remains silent 
despite the strong position taken by 12 MS and the EP against the liberalisation of the 
system. Thus, if the text is not amended by the parliament and the council (co-decision 
procedure) on the occasion of the reform of the CAP, the liberalisation of planting rights 
will apply from January 1st 2016. The EU Consilium, must decide against the measure of 
liberalisation in favour of resetting of replanting, but would it require the qualified 
majority and no blocking minority. 
6 The lobbying action in vineyards liberalisation: a model to interpret the 
results obtained 
Referring to the PC theory and cooperative game model’s, our paper tries to explain how 
some organisations, even though they account for a restricted basic trade union and in 
some cases expression of a group of farmer oligopolistic firms, are not sufficiently able to 
influence CMO wine reform to the re-opening planting rights dossier. 
The optimistic view that has characterised the liberalisation proposal from the EU, 
have come up against, a sector wrapped in a deep crisis: a reduction in grape prices; 
grapes not harvested; thousands of hectolitres of wine stored in cellars and the request 
from many regions to apply a measure of crisis distillation. 
Considering our case of an amended proposal and a re-opening the dossier about 
vineyards liberalisation: each MS could vote in favour of the proposal mainly promoted 
by the EFOW and the wine EU MS. 
The Pokrivcak et al. (2006) (PCS-model’s), propose a decision making system on the 
CAP that includes two phase. The first one determining the national preferences on the 
agriculture policy for each EU MS (net beneficiary of the CAP and net contributor to the 
CAP)8; the second one the decision making processes that are model presented. The 
authors show how these results change under institutional assumptions such as voting 
procedures (majority rules), and how they are affected by changes in the external 
environment (Swinnen and Olper, 2008). 
In the present paper, we discussed and applied only the partial model of CAP decision 
making as a set of voting rounds to determine the qualified majoring voting or 
‘equilibrium intervention price’ within the council of minister as PCS-model’s 
describing. 
The main reason is that the decision-making process is an institutionally complex 
procedure, in which the member state governments, the EUC, and the Council of 
Agricultural Ministers all play an important role. While the council of ministers 
ultimately takes the decisions, the EUC has the sole right of proposal. The council of 
ministers cannot formally consider any proposal that has not come from the commission. 
If the qualified majority in the council does not approve the proposal, the commission 
drafts a new proposal until a final compromise is reached. Each MS can propose an 
amendment to the commission proposal. In practice, the commission considers political 
acceptability of its proposal by the council and may be ‘obliged’ to adjust its proposals in 
accordance with the council’s line of thinking (Fearne, 1991). 
The PCS-model’ assumes that: 
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• PEU0 the ‘status quo of subsidy’ – as the existing common intervention price in EU. 
• PEUN the ‘commission proposal of subsidy’ – as commission proposal a common 
intervention price for the next year. Commission proposal PEUN can be same as last 
year’s or not to PEU0. 
• Pj# the politically optimal per unit subsidy for a country. 
• j part of EU, i.e., member state. 
• vj the voting decision by the minister of country j. 
• Γ the minimum number of votes needed to approve the proposal. 
The council of minister votes. Their votes, will be in favour of the proposal if the 
proposed price PEUN is nearer to his government’s optimum than the current subsidy  
PEU0. 
The first equation represent the case were the vj = 1 and we assume that voting 
decision by the ministers of each EU state is positive (favourable) – the difference 
between a subsidy proposed PEUN and Pj# politically optimal per unit subsidy for a 
country is less than or equal to the different between PEU0 and Pj# 
N # 0 #
j EU j EU jv 1 iff P P P P= − ≤ −  (1) 
The second equation represent the case were the vj = 0 and we assume that the voting 
decision by the ministers of each EU state is negative (un-favourable) – the difference 
between a subsidy proposed PEUN and Pj# politically optimal per unit subsidy for a 
country is greater than the different between PEU0 and Pj# 
N # 0 #
j EU j EU jv 0 iff P P P P= − > −  (2) 
The proposal is accepted if the sum of njv is the number of votes of country j should and 
is than or equal to Γ, the minimum number of votes needed to approve the proposal. 
v
j j
j
n v Γ∗ ≥∑  (3) 
The equation (3) represented an ‘equilibrium intervention price’, that will depend on the 
decision making rules which determine the amount of votes needed and on the 
distribution of votes njv. 
As stated considering our case, the liberalisation of replanting votes. 
The commission has the right to amend or withdraw its proposal as a long as council 
has not taken a decision and it has the right to change its proposal during the legislative 
process. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of votes for each MS opposed to vineyards 
liberalisation and favourable to re-opening of dossier. The sum of the votes obtained by 
12 MS is not sufficient to reach a qualified majority vote.9 
This provision enables a group of MS to demonstrate their opposition to a text even if 
the group is not large enough in number to constitute a blocking majority10. In fact, 
another 2 MS, 66 votes, and 1% of the population are needed. 
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Table 2 Vineyards liberalisation: Member State in favour of reopening to dossier 
Member states Votes % of population 
Germany 29 16.5 
France 29 12.9 
Italy 29 12.0 
Spanish 27 9.0 
Cyprus 4 0.2 
Romania 14 4.3 
Portugal 12 2.1 
Hungary 12 2.0 
Luxembourg 4 0.1 
Austria 10 1.7 
Czech Republic 12 2.1 
Republic of Slovakia 7 1.1 
Total votes 189 64.0% 
Qualified majority 255 65.0% 
Source: Our elaboration from EU Commission and EFOW reports 
In PCS-model’s (scenario 1), the subsidy purposed for the UE member in the new 
legislation (PEUN) must be higher than the past one (PEU0) or that PEUN – Pj# ≤ PEU0 – Pj#. 
Not having clearly defined a subsidy policy for the liberalisation scheme, penalised 
the re-opening of the dossier for each member country (Pj#). In fact, this was defended 
only for the production MS but not for the other countries (especially north Europe) 
which had no direct benefit the item (Pj#). 
If the direct benefits are lower with the reopening of the liberalisation dossier, 
confirming the validity by of the PCS-model’s, even with ‘negative response’ (3a) and 
without equibrium intervention price as represented in equation (3). 
In our case [equation (3a)]: 
v
j j
i
v
j
n v Γ
n 189 255 Γ
∗ <
= <
∑
 (3a) 
Compared to PCS-model’s proposed, in this paper it has not been possible to quantify the 
level of subsidies for vineyard liberalisation. 
The pressure of EFOW actor’ was sufficient to obtain 12 countries voting for the 
reopening the dossier about vineyard liberalisation (njv = 189, see Table 2). 
7 Conclusions 
The ‘battle’ on the surfaces of vineyards liberalisations sees two main lobby protagonists: 
farmers unions and EFOW. 
The case is particularly interesting because it represents a perfect example of ‘false 
order’ in the political negotiations and a lack of cooperation. The obstruction that  
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COPA-COGECA have played against the DGAGRI proposal, was not intended to 
prevent the action on the proposal itself, but for the financial ‘fiche’ that it could be 
transferred to other measures more ‘remunerative trade union’11. The low and restricted 
CMO wine budget made a trade-off necessary between trade unions and pressure groups. 
On the one hand the ‘agricultural pressure groups’, which had to take home, as a 
result of his lobbying, the ‘apparent’ defence of productions. On the other hand the 
EFOW want to show its strength inside the European Parliament and between producers 
MS. The two lobbies didn’t corporate. This situation confirmed that individuals will act 
collectively to provide private goods, but not to provide public goods. Often, the more 
concentrated the lobby becomes the more effective it is. As shown by Olson (1965) and 
the scenario has verified, the natural cooperation between a relatively large number of 
people or groups, is less probable than with a smaller group: mainly because when the 
group size increases, it becomes more difficult for social control actions, even informally, 
it is necessary to ensure the implementation of conditional cooperation strategies. 
Buchanan and Tullock’s (1962) view is that each ‘political outcome’ emerges from a 
process, a mechanism of exchange, a compromise agreement between people, each has 
private inclinations about possible alternatives. When this private preference is satisfied, 
it is possible to explain collective action and a team player. 
The behaviour of the commission and member state seem to respond to the theory of 
PC: politicians find themselves in front of a trade off in choosing a policy in the general 
interest of the community that would lose the support of the lobby or encourage the latter 
and unleash the electorate: they choose the policy that best maximises their objective 
function and generated the condition of win set between pressure groups and  
public decisions (Olson, 1965; Putman, 1988; Rausser  and Freebairn, 1974; Rausser and 
Roland, 2009). 
The reasons for this partial failure lobbyist action are probably partly attributable to 
the fragmented action that the agriculture and lobbying system has always expressed its 
inability to act with appropriate means of pressure, if not for individual corporate battles 
aimed more to justify the existence of different organisation, rather than worrying about 
the overall effects of the new economic policy and the future of CAP and wine sector 
post 2013. 
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Notes 
1 Title V, Production Potential, Chapter II. Reg.479/2008. 
2 The currently applicable voting system of the Council is defined in the Treaty of Nice since its 
entry into force on 1 February 2003. 
3 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Common Organisation of the market in wine and 
amending certain regulations. Brussels, 4 July 2007. 
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4 European Commission, D.G. for Agriculture and Rural Development (2006a) ‘Wine – 
common market organisation’, Working paper, February; European Commission, D.G. for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (2006b) Towards a Sustainable European Wine Sector, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Brussels, 
22.06.2006 COM(2006) 319 final. 
5 The wine total budget is 1.4 billion of € from 2009 to 2014. 
6 Council Regulation No.1234/2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets 
and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products. 
7 Communication of Thierry Coste, Chairman of COPA – COGECA’s wine working group.  
30 November 2011. 
8 Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and, UK, Portugal were net 
contributor countries whereas France, Denmark, Poland, Ireland, Greece, Spain Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Cyprus and Slovenia were net beneficiaries. 
9 Since 1st January 2007, a qualified majority was achieved if 255 out of 345 votes were cast by 
at least 14 MS. The vote distribution is 29 votes for Germany, France, Italy and UK; 22 for 
Spanish and Poland; 14 for Romania; 13 for Netherlands; 12 for Greece, Belgium and Czech 
Republic; Hungary and Portugal; 10 for Sweden, Austria, Bulgaria; 7 for Slovakia, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland and Lithuania; 4 for Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Luxembourg;  
3 from Malta. 
10 In this case, the group of MS must notify the council of its opposition to the adoption of the 
act. The council must then do everything within its power to find a satisfactory solution in 
order to address the concerns raised by the group of MS. Moreover, these deliberations within 
the council are completed within a reasonable period and should not prejudice the time-limits 
laid down by the law of the EU. 
11 Such as the payments for crisis distillation (the initial proposal was the abolition of the market 
measure); the restructuring of vineyards and aid for concentrated grape must (in the Italian 
case). 
